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Regional Challenges

Expanding the Rebalance:
Confronting China in Latin America
Daniel Morgan

Abstract: China’s expansion into Latin America might well outflank
the US rebalance in Asia. The United States needs a broader strategic option, one capable of ensuring access to markets and of reducing future strategic risk to US interests in Latin America.

T

he rise of Chinese power in the Asia-Pacific region and in Latin
America is a growing concern for US strategy. Recent US focus
on the Middle East has facilitated Beijing’s political, economic,
and military expansion from the Pacific into South America. A new global
economy has opened opportunities for growth and development with
China and others in the Asia-Pacific. Some countries have responded
with commitment to China in terms of economic trade and investment.
In addition, governments such as Peru, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, and
Costa Rica have pledged international political support for Chinese interests, arms sales, and military training and education cooperation. These
developments challenge US strategy, as Chinese presence in both regions
is arguably part of an intensifying competition between Beijing and the
United States. This developing trans-Pacific interdependency between
the two regions creates one integrated problem rather than two separate
regional ones.
The growing cooperation between the governments in both regions
and China presents political, economic, and military challenges that call
for the incorporation of the Western Hemisphere into a Asia-Pacific
strategy. Evan Ellis notes, “the principal strategic imperative for the
United States historically has been, and continues to be, the region’s
geographic and economic connectedness to this country.”1 First, the
different political interests of the United States and China can create
tension and instability, or deny US access in both regions. Second, extensive trade and investment agreements across both regions are creating
economic interdependencies and undermining US influence, and generating further political, social, and economic tensions. Third, the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC) military posture and forward presence in
the South China Sea aims to improve its anti-access and area-denial
(A2AD) capacity. The PRC’s military expansion through arms sales and
other means provide security alternatives for Latin American governments and support Chinese military power in the Asia-Pacific region.
1      R. Evan Ellis, “Strategic Insights: The Strategic Relevance of Latin America for the United
States,” December 8, 2014, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The
Strategic-Relevance-of-Latin-America/2014/12/08.
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For these reasons, the rebalancing to Asia does not adequately address
the growing interdependencies between the two regions and Beijing’s
pursuit of its interests.
Accordingly, the United States must adapt its regional approach
to Asia. Cross-regional cooperation in policy areas outside trade and
investment is emerging independently, such as military training and
arms sales, which demands a more holistic and synchronized approach.
Without a broader Pacific strategy, non-economic cooperation can
hinder the United States and the security and prosperity of its allies and
partners. The United States should expand the rebalance to Asia into a
trans-Pacific strategy that incorporates Latin America. Without a transPacific strategy, a US regional approach will only create strategic risk,
and enable China to draw on its influence in the Western Hemisphere to
support its interests elsewhere.
This article examines the political, economic, and military challenges
posed by China’s increasing influence in both regions, and discusses why
a new trans-Pacific strategy can best address them.

Political Challenges

Beijing’s political actions in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific
region are creating an integrated cross-regional problem for US interests
rather than two separate regional ones. In response to Chinese actions
in the latter, the United States has strengthened its regional relations and
defense cooperation with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile,
China’s actions have resulted in more political influence (in the Western
Hemisphere) with traditional and non-traditional US partners, potentially undermining US values and relationships. At the same time,
governments in the Asia-Pacific have developed relationships based on
common political values and economic interests. Japan, Australia, and
South Korea have deepened ties with some of the region’s governments,
particularly the Pacific Alliance of Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Chile.
Some Asia-Pacific governments have also become permanent observers
to the Organization of American States (OAS) due to common political
interests. South American and Caribbean governments have recognized
the strategic value of areas along the Pacific rim, and Chinese trade
and investment alternatives in order to promote future growth and
development.

Diplomacy and Soft Power

Chinese soft power is aimed at gaining access to governments in
order to maintain national security, ensure the inviolability of Chinese
sovereignty and territory, and to enhance economic growth.2 In the
pursuit of these interests, Beijing employs a partnership diplomacy to
“foster a multi-polar balance of power situation in order to safeguard its
position and interests in an international system dominated by American
pre-eminence.”3 As a result, US access to markets and other policy areas
is challenged due to Chinese alternatives in trade, investment, arms,
2      Stephen Harner, “Clarity in Core Interests, a Must for A New Type of Great Power
Relations,” April 8, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/clarity-in-core-interests
-a-must-for-a-new-type-of-great-power-relations.
3      David Scott, “China and the EU: A Strategic Axis for the Twenty-First Century?” International
Relations 21, no. 1 (March 2007): 23-45.
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and technology. Beijing has established forty-seven partnerships,
in which eight are with Latin American nations (Brazil, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Chile).4 In addition,
in 2008, Beijing released a white paper specifying new relations with
Latin American governments.5 These regional partnerships may pose an
integrated trans-Pacific challenge to the United States.
Chinese soft power in Latin America continues to gain increased
support for Beijing’s foreign policy goals. China’s expanding influence
in the Western Hemisphere challenges US political interests, especially
when relations with the Asia-Pacific are increasingly more connected. In
2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated China wanted to strengthen
strategic ties and enhance mutual political trust, pursue creative and
practical cooperation, and deepen cultural understanding with the
region’s nations.6 Despite such statements, Beijing’s political actions
undermine US interests concerning democracy, human rights, rule of
law, and other international norms. In addition, China continues to
demand the political unification of Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over
the South China Sea.

Political Solutions
Trans-Pacific Multilateralism

Regional organizations provide the means for a trans-Pacific strategy to build intergovernmental and interorganizational unity of effort,
organizations to protect US interests, and to reestablish US leadership.
Prominent regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast
Asia Nations (ASEAN), Organization of American States, InterAmerican Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the World
Bank provide the United States with the ability to influence emerging
trans-Pacific challenges. Cooperation between the:
two regions is growing, as evidenced by increased bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic agreements….such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC),
India, Brazil, and South Africa Forum (IBSA), and Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (BRICS).7

These specific and exclusive organizations are increasingly relevant
in developing cross-regional ties. Regional organizations, however,
provide the forum to settle disputes and reinforce cooperative, transparent partnerships. Consensus building and conflict resolution must
occur primarily through regional organizations to ensure legitimacy,
not solely in narrow ones like FEALAC or BRICS. Without regional
organizations understanding trans-Pacific impacts, Chinese alternatives
4      Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a Changing
World (Madrid, Spain: European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, June 2014), 18-19.
5      Russell Hsiao, “China’s Strategic Engagement with Latin America,” November 24, 2008,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34164#.
VNURXkI2_FI.
6      President Hu Jintao, “Joining Hands to Enhance Friendly Relations between China and Latin
America,” public speech, Brazilian Parliament, November 12, 2004.
7      Shaping the Future of the Asia—Latin America and the Caribbean Relationship (Metro Manila: Asian
Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank Institute,
2012), http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29748/shaping-future-asia-lac.pdf.
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will continue to undermine US interests and support Beijing’s goals in
the Asia-Pacific.
Transparency, inclusion, and multilateralism provide the principles
for establishing sustainable mutual interdependence and stability.8
These principles can also encourage China to be a part of the solution,
rather than create a perception of containing or isolating it. Divergent
approaches between the United States and China require sophisticated
diplomacy to manage crises or perceptions. A second critical challenge
exists with various multilateral agreements, like China’s Free Trade of the
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) contrasted with the US Trans-Pacific Partnership
trade agreement. These opposing approaches threaten transparency,
inclusion, and multilateralism in both regions. A trans-Pacific strategy
should build cross-regional multilateral organizations that prevail over
exclusive alternatives and institutions such as the Free Trade of the AsiaPacific, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Mercosur, and the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). Another
example for consideration is an expanded ASEAN Regional Forum,
which already has 27 trans-Pacific members. A trans-Pacific strategy
that promotes transparency, inclusion, and multilateralism will best
facilitate cooperation, consensus, and enforcement with China, rather
than confronting China separately in two regions.

Economic Challenges

Latin American and Caribbean governments recognize they must
“pivot” to the Asia-Pacific in order to ensure economic growth and
development. Trade flows with the Asia-Pacific are well established and
still growing. Regional multilateral and bilateral trade agreements have
resulted in integrated supply chains. These supply chains have linked
many of the interests of the United States and those of its allies and
partners in both regions. However, Chinese alternatives and support to
anti-US economic organizations undermine US interests and can disrupt
important supply chains. These tensions can best be resolved by a transPacific regime that protects the interests of all players, to include China.

Trade Imbalance

Deepening trade relationships between China, Latin America, and
Asia-Pacific governments increase competition over access to resources.
As the report, Shaping the Future of the Asia-Latin America and the Caribbean
Relationship, written jointly by researchers from the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, revealed:
...trade between Asia and LAC [Latin America and Caribbean] nations has
expanded at an annual rate of 20.5 percent over the last 12 years. The report
also stated that Asia accounts for 21 percent of its international trade, rapidly
narrowing the gap with the United States, which has a 34 percent share.9

8      R. Evan Ellis, The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America (Washington, DC:
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013), 158.
9      Inter-American Development Bank, “IDB and ADB Look at Future of Asia-Latin America
Relations,” May 5, 2012, http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/trade/idb-and-adb-look-at-future-of-asialatin-america-relations,6688.html.
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China’s trade with the region’s governments increased from 29 billion
dollars in 2003 to 270 billion dollars in 2012.10 This surge has provided
Chinese alternatives to United States model of promoting free market
values, human rights, democracy, and security cooperation.
This surge has also created trade imbalances that could lead to an
undesirable reduction of US trade, and other tensions. First, Beijing’s
expansion along with increased Asia-Pacific trade is leading to globally
integrated supply chains challenged by cultural barriers, increased costs,
and market development outlays, which all lead to declining profits for
commodity-based Latin America economies.11 Second, South American
exports to China total over 70 percent and are principally limited to
commodities, which stifles their trade diversification. Third, China and
other Asia-Pacific nations export a wide range of cheap manufactured
goods, including cars, electronics, equipment, and other parts and
components. These imports, unfortunately, impede domestic manufacturing and further economic growth beyond commodities. Last,
slowing Chinese growth and its low value added imports threaten the
vitality of South American and Caribbean economic growth and development. These factors have contributed to International Monetary Fund
and World Bank expectations that the region’s growth rate will remain
under 3 percent for 2015-2018, which is almost a 50 percent decrease
over the last decade.12
China’s declining growth and reduced commodity prices demand
increased US focus with its southern allies and partners. The United
States must enable economic diversification with broader and deeper
market integration, or the Latin American region could expect instability similar to which plagued their governments in the past. Commodity
prices have dropped by a quarter since 2011. After growing by an average
of 4.3 percent from 2004 to 2011, the region’s economies managed just
2.6 percent last year.13 But, an increasing and more concerning fear is
Beijing has slowed its target growth rate to 7 percent, which can further
impact South American and Mexican trade and revenue.14 The United
States can help offset the region’s lower commodity exports to China by
coordinating with other Asia-Pacific governments to increase purchases
from the South American and Caribbean economies.

Investment Challenges

Chinese investment in Latin America impedes US access by providing governments with financing alternatives. The region has been
a destination for Chinese investment, attracting approximately 40

10      R. Evan Ellis, “The Rise of China in the Americas,” Security and Defense Studies Review 16
(2014): 90.
11      Sean Ryu, Michelle Kam, Zhan Ying, Jiang Yi Wei, and Yang Chao, Globally Integrated Supply
Chain: China Perspective (Somers, NY: IBM Global Services, 2008), 3.
12      Santiago Levy, “When Will Fast Growth Return to Latin America,” May 9, 2014, http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/05/09-growth-return-latin-america-levy.
13      “Life After the Commodity Boom,” The Economist, May 29, 2014, http://www.economist.
com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivityrises-life.
14      “Why China’s Economy is Slowing,” The Economist, March 11, 2015, http://www.economist.
com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-8.

108

Parameters 45(3) Autumn 2015

billion dollars since 2010.15 In 2010, China’s loan commitments to the
region’s governments totaled 37 billion dollars, exceeding that of the
World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the US ImportExport Bank combined.16 Beijing’s willingness to provide foreign direct
investment not only helps offset lower commodity prices, but increases
Chinese access and influence across the region. Investment with Beijing
comes with a “no strings attached” policy that does not require adherence to western requirements for environmental compliance, fiscal
responsibility, or transparency in transactions and contracting.17 These
benefits provide governments with incentives to invest with China, but
usually at the expense of social and environmental risk. This investment
approach only strengthens Beijing’s relations with anti-US governments
like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and increasingly with Argentina.
Beijing’s principle of noninterventionism and lack of adherence to
high standards create negative social and environmental consequences
and contradict western values and international norms. Chinese noninterventionism allows investment in governments regardless of human
rights’ practices, values, or rule of law. China’s limited corporate social
responsibility, particularly the neglect of workers’ rights and energy and
environmental standards, also facilitates corruption and social unrest.
Recent international attention to inadequate corporate social responsibility and its noninterventionism policy, however, is leading to positive
change. If China improves its international labor and environmental
practices, anti-corruption efforts, and local community support, Chinese
investment alternatives could take investments and market share from
the United States.

Polarization of Economic Organizations

Chinese trade and investment and aggressive posture in the South
China Sea are dividing Western Hemisphere and Asia-Pacific governments into opposing political and economic camps of the United States
and China. In the Asia-Pacific, Beijing may reenergize the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed free trade
bloc that would include the ASEAN member states plus Australia,
India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, but not the United
States.18 In South America and the Caribbean, Chinese trade and investment has shifted anti-US governments away from western institutions
that promote transparency, rule of law, and other international norms.
The Chinese alternative has also prolonged the negative effect of less
responsible economic organizations like the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America and Mercosur. Other countries like Nicaragua,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela have also formed anti-western alternatives that deny US access and facilitate China’s expansion.
15      Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Chinese Foreign Direct
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: China-Latin America Cross-Council Task Force.
Working Document,” November 2013, http://www.cepal.org/en/publications/35927-chineseforeign-direct-investment-latin-america-and-caribbean-china-latin-america.
16      Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in
Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, March 2012), 1, http://www.thedialogue.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/NewBanks_FULLTEXT.pdf
17      Ibid., 19.
18      Shannon Tiezzi, “US Pressures China to Kill Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Talks,”
November 4, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-pressures-china-to-kill-asia-pacific-free
-trade-agreement-talks.
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Economic Solutions

Significant opportunities exist to liberalize trade agreements and
investments in order to strengthen Western Hemisphere economies that
support common Asia-Pacific and US interests. One such opportunity
is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which currently includes the
United States, Canada, Peru, Chile, Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, and likely Colombia and
Costa Rica. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an ongoing trade negotiation that opens market access across the Western Hemisphere and
Asia-Pacific and manages 21st century issues in a global economy.19
Current Trans-Pacific Partnership participants comprise 11.2 percent of
the world’s population and almost 40 percent of the Global Domestic
Product (GDP).20 Critical to the Trans-Pacific Partnership is that it links
Western Hemisphere nations to the emerging Asia-Pacific supply and
value added chains and facilitates US and Asia-Pacific investment.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership can provide the economic anchor
to a trans-Pacific strategy because it would provide a living, inclusive,
and rules-based regime for cross-regional trade and investment. In
addition, the Trans-Pacific Partnership can drive other non-economic
relationships concerning security cooperation and assistance and other
policy areas like climate and energy. This multilateral agreement has the
potential to build a long-term economic strategy and statecraft model
that can promote sustainable cooperation over hazardous competition.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership addresses fair competition, consumer
protection, labor rights, liberalized access to investment under rules of
law, intellectual property rights, and small and medium business opportunities.21 The Trans-Pacific Partnership also creates jobs, increases
wages, and reinforces democratic institutions. This trade agreement can
address one aspect of the integrated problem by incorporating Latin
America political and economic development.

Military Challenges

PRC arms sales in Latin America generate revenue and support
Chinese military modernization in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese military
partnerships in the Southern Hemisphere give them increased access
and influence in their decision-making based on Beijing’s interests and
actions in the Asia-Pacific. For example, an Asia-Pacific conflict that
arises from miscalculation, or a deliberate decision, gives China the
ability to secure political support from South American and Caribbean
governments for their actions in the Asia-Pacific. Any US assumption
that Chinese actions in Western Hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific are two
separate problems overlooks Beijing’s long-term strategic perspective of
gaining multi-regional influence. PRC military presence south of the
United States combined with growing political and economic linkages
creates an integrated problem for US security engagement and influence. A US trans-Pacific military strategy must forge new cross-regional

19      Office of the US Trade Representative, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of US
Objectives,” http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives.
20      Ibid.
21      Ibid.
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security cooperation relationships between South American-Caribbean
and Asia-Pacific militaries.

Chinese Military in the Pacific

China’s aggressive stance and military forward presence and posture,
particularly in the South China Sea, intend to replace the United States
as the regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific. The region is a vital driver
of the global economy and includes the world’s busiest international sea
lanes and nine of the ten largest ports. Thousands of maritime vessels
transverse the South China Sea, ranging from fishing boats to coastal
naval ships to trade ships. Beijing claims sovereignty and territorial
rights for much of the region’s waterways in direct confrontation or
threat to Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei.
The Asia-Pacific is also home to seven of the world’s ten largest standing
militaries and five of the world’s declared nuclear nations.22
China’s demands for territorial integrity and sovereignty in the
Asia-Pacific region challenge freedom of navigation and access to
resources for the United States and other extra-regional actors. The
PRC’s military modernization and expansion into the South China Sea
increases Chinese anti-access and area-denial capacity and capabilities.
Heightened tensions and miscalculations by US allies or partners, or
other actors, could draw the United States into an escalating conflict
or other military commitments. Impacts of such miscalculations can
also affect trade flows and investment and impose significant costs on
Latin American, Caribbean, and Asia-Pacific economies. Such high risks
demand a new strategic approach, one that views the challenge as a
trans-Pacific problem, rather than a regional one.

Chinese Military in Latin America

Political partnerships and economic trade blocs in the Western
Hemisphere facilitate Chinese military activities and challenge US
access and its building of security capacity in the region. Latin American
governments, to include US partners, have increased ties to the PRC
military through a growing number of official visits, military officer
education exchanges, training exercises, and arms sales.23 China sent 130
riot police to Haiti from 2004 to 2012 as part of the UN’s peacekeeping
force, becoming the first Chinese uniformed formation to serve in the
Western Hemisphere. In the past decade, China sold 58 million dollars
worth of K-8 Karakorum jets to Bolivia, upward of 150 million dollars
in air surveillance systems to Venezuela, donated military materiel
to multiple countries, and sold Peru a mobile field hospital and other
equipment worth 300 million dollars.24 They are reportedly about to
sell 1 billion dollars in arms to Argentina, including armored personnel carriers and Chinese-designed fighter jets, with the likely candidates
22      Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III, “PACOM Senate Armed Services Committee Posture
Statement,” March 25, 2014, http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/
Article/565155/pacom-senate-armed-services-committee-testimony.aspx.
23      General John F. Kelly, US Southern Command, “Posture Statement of General John F.
Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander,” February 6, 2014, http://www.southcom.mil/
newsroom/Documents/2014_SOUTHCOM_Posture_Statement_HASC_FINAL_PDF.pdf.
24      Gabriel Marcella, “China’s Military Activity in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Winter
2012, http://americasquarterly.org/Marcella.
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being the FC-1 Xiaolong, JF-17 Thunder, or the J-10.25 Last, China is
taking aggressive efforts in technology transfer programs with Brazil,
Argentina, and Venezuela in areas of space technology for military and
civilian purposes. Chinese military relations in the region do not pose
an imminent military threat to the United States or its allies and partners, but they are an indicator of how seriously Beijing considers Latin
America as a military market.
Beijing’s arms sales to Latin American governments generate
revenue that advances its anti-access and area-denial capabilities in the
Asia-Pacific, which directly threatens the United States and its allies.
In addition, PRC military presence and influence in the region provides China with strategic options that can overtly or covertly support
Chinese activities in the Asia-Pacific. The United States cannot underestimate the threat posed by Beijing’s military presence in the Western
Hemisphere. The United States should not approach this issue as a separate regional concern. Increased Chinese activities and influence in the
Western Hemisphere provide Beijing with a range of ways and means
that can negatively impact US interests in the Asia-Pacific. The United
States must integrate South American and Caribbean governments into
a trans-Pacific military solution in order to ensure US interests are protected in the Asia-Pacific.

Military Solutions
Security Cooperation

Standing mutual defense treaties, agreements, and theater engagement plans provide the foundation for cross-regional military security
cooperation that can address the trans-Pacific challenge of China.
The Pacific Alliance, for example, has facilitated multilateral agreement between Colombia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Japan, South Korea,
and Australia. Chile and Mexico participated with Japan in the NonProliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which was adopted as an
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by the United Nations in April 2013.26 Other
countries that supported this initiative were Costa Rica and Argentina.
These cooperative partnerships provide a foundation for addressing
China’s actions in both regions as one integrated problem. The US
military must examine current theater campaign plans and synchronize
them with developing trade and investment relationships in order to
achieve the best holistic solution to the challenge posed by China.
China’s military presence and posture and expanding relations
between Latin American and Asia-Pacific governments necessitate
unique cross combatant command coordination between US Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) and US Pacific Command (PACOM). The
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff should begin
identifying options and enabling geographic combatant commanders
with specific authorities to build better cross combatant coordination
in support of a trans-Pacific strategy. Southern Command and Pacific
25      Jose Higuera and Usman Ansari, “Argentina’s Jet Fighter Replacement Options Narrow,”
Defense News, November 30, 2014.
26      Akira Yamada, “Japanese Diplomacy in the Latin America and the Caribbean,” Americas
Quarterly, August 22, 2013, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/japanese-diplomacy-latinamerica-and-caribbean.
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Command should bolster partner militaries based on cross-regional
political ties, emerging trade and investment linkages, like those within
the TPP, and current mutual defense treaties. Under new multinational
security agreements, geographic combatant commanders should then
expand current cooperative security locations (CSLs) and build new
locations based on existing and growing trade and investment relationships.27 A coalition approach to cooperative security location expansion
and integration would facilitate trans-Pacific military partner capacity
building among both regions’ militaries. This approach would provide
opportunities for multinational training and education exchanges with
United States, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific militaries operating
together in any region, not just one.
Cross-combatant command coordination that integrates both
regions’ militaries into a comprehensive security cooperation will
demonstrate US resolve, reduce cultural barriers, and increase burdensharing among partnered nations. Geographic combatant commanders
should develop cross-combatant command multinational wargames and
exercises focused on disaster relief and other humanitarian situations.
Pacific Command and Southern Command should also integrate South
American and Mexican military leadership into crisis management or
contingency operations as much as possible. This integration focused
on common objectives will also reinforce the need for interoperability
among US allies and partners. A trans-Pacific option with multinational
military capacity and capability will reinforce shared political, economic,
and military interests, rather than a predominant US regional presence.
Critical to the trans-Pacific military approach, however, is transparent
military-to-military interaction between United States and Chinese
maritime, air, and land forces in order to gain understanding on mutual
shared interests.
The US Army Pacific (USARPAC) Pacific Pathways provides an
innovative example of a potential trans-Pacific option that would include
Latin American governments. The Pacific Pathways initiative is an Army
land power approach to the rebalancing in Asia strategic priority by
providing sustained US land forces in the region. The Pacific Pathways
develops joint interdependence, increases US military partner building
capacity, and sets theater conditions that prevent and shape potential
conflict. The United States should look to expand the Pacific Pathways
initiative in coordination with the US Army National Guard (USANG)
partnership program into a multinational trans-Pacific Pathways. The
inclusion of the Army National Guard reinforces the multi-component
Total Army concept and gives the United States increased land power
capacity and capability. The enlargement of Pacific Pathways can evolve
into a trans-Pacific cross combatant command campaign that maintains
US resolve with its allies and partners, while sharing the security burden
through partner building capacity. For example, Southern Command
could extend their annual PANAMAX air, sea, and land military exercise to include Asia-Pacific militaries, to include China possibly. The
Pacific Pathways initiative along with other Southern Command and
27      A cooperative security location is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent US personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve
both for security cooperation activities and contingency access. Examples are in Aruba-Curacao and
Comalapa, El Salvador in SOUTHCOM and Thailand and others in PACOM.
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Pacific Command exercises must remain inclusive to Chinese cooperation and participation in order to reinforce transparency, inclusion, and
multilateralism principles.

Multilateral Arms Control

China’s military capacity and capability in the Pacific and arms sales
and technology transfers in Latin America demand new approaches in
US security assistance programs. China’s official defense budget rose
from 669.1 billion yuan in 2012 to 740.6 billion yuan (equivalent to 119
billion dollars) in 2013, a rise of 10.7 percent.28 China now has the second
largest defense budget in the world.29 Latin American defense spending
is forecasted to grow from 63 billion dollars in 2011 to 65 billion dollars
by 2014, with 20 percent being available for procurement from China or
other external actors.30 Chinese anti-access and area-denial capacity and
capability and increasing arms sales in the Western Hemisphere necessitate regional arms control organizations in order to ensure stability and
a balance of power in both regions. Two recent agreements on military
confidence building measures in the Asia-Pacific can help China and the
US reach better levels of trans-Pacific cooperation: the notification of
major military activities and a code of conduct for safe conduct of naval
and air military encounters.31 The United States must build on these
agreements to include trans-Pacific concerns and pursue open dialogue
with China to move away from bi-lateral conflict resolution towards
multilateral cooperation, transparency, and conflict resolution.
A trans-Pacific strategy should consider a multilateral arms control
regime similar to the 1990 Conventional Arms Forces in Europe Treaty.
Although this treaty was designed for a late post Cold War period, the
treaty sought to control the proliferation of technologies that might
contribute to conventional or unconventional weapons programs.32
These multilateral frameworks could place regional ceilings on specific
capabilities in order to promote stability and reduce the possibility of
miscalculations that could lead to armed conflict. In addition, such a
program would also stipulate reports and compliance inspections on
specific equipment, force structure, and training maneuvers for specific
at risk countries. Last, this regime would also detail specific requirements and constraints concerning cyber and space domains to protect
US interests and enforce rule of law across both regions. A trans-Pacific
cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanism that addresses
emerging threats can mitigate unnecessary militarization in both regions
and reinforce further confidence-building measures.

28     Dean Cheng and Walter Lohman, “Solutions 2014: China,” The Heritage Foundation, http://
solutions.heritage.org/china.
29     Ibid.
30     Marcella, “China’s Military Activity in Latin America.”
31     Bonnie Glaser, “A Step Forward in US-China Military Ties: Two CBM Agreements,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 11, 2014, http://amti.csis.org/us-china
-cbms-stability-maritime-asia.
32     Amy Wolf, Paul Kerr, and Mary Beth Nikitin, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of
Treaties and Agreements (Washington, DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
July 21, 2014), 38.
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Conclusion

Beijing’s political, economic, and military ties in Latin America and
its aggressive posture in the Asia-Pacific region can threaten US capacity
in issues ranging from free trade and investment to security cooperation and assistance. China’s diplomatic approach through economic
statecraft and strategy, which leads to increased political and military
influence, is increasingly competing with US interests in Latin America
and elsewhere. Chinese alternatives continue to reinforce the legitimacy
of authoritarian, or semi-authoritarian, governments in both regions,
which threaten US interests and its allies and partners. US allies and
partners are also less prone to act in accordance with US interests than
in past decades due to increasing opportunities globally. The United
States must adjust traditional regional statecraft and strategy towards
more contemporary diplomacy to identify cross-regional linkages
between governments, tie them into common objectives, and develop
an integrated approach. If not, China’s pursuit of multi-regional leadership will threaten US interests and potentially lead to increased tension
and unpredictable outcomes.
Relationships between Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and the United
States are inextricably linked across common interests and objectives.
No region exists in isolation in the 21st century. The tough balance is
the United States must remain economically engaged with China and
encourage free-market cooperation. At the same time, the United States
must develop and maintain comprehensive and strong responses to
negative Chinese behaviors, such as support to authoritarian organizations and cyber espionage activities. The US government needs to
readjust its current re-balancing in Asia, and develop a wide-ranging
and cross-regional approach to reinforce Latin America and Asia-Pacific
linkages in support of US interests. This approach will help the United
States better rationalize its power in an era of declining or static defense
budgets.

